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Fighting for White Rule in Africa:
The Central African Federation, Katanga, and
the Congo Crisis, -
B   of Zimbabwe in , black guerrillaforces fought a long war throughout the s against the white-controlled government of Rhodesia. Twenty years earlier, in the
late s and early s, long before the start of the insurgency that
led to the end of white rule, the white settlers of Rhodesia, then part of
the Central African Federation, had fought against black rule in the
Belgian Congo. The focus of this fight was the Congo’s province of
Katanga, which bordered on the Federation to the north. The struggle
in the Congo forms part of the story of white Rhodesian resistance to
black majority rule that lasted until  (and until  in South
Africa). Even before Belgium decided to pull out of the Congo in
, the Federation’s whites were looking to effect a political union
with the Belgian settlers in Katanga; and once Belgium withdrew in the
summer of , the Federation did all it could to help to preserve
white control over the Congo. This article examines the two related
issues of the proposed political union between the Federation and
Katanga before , and the Federation’s support for white settler
interests in Katanga and the Congo from  to , when this
phase of the Congo crisis ended. It shows that determined white resist-
ance began earlier and cast its net more widely than once thought, thus
adding to our understanding of the decay of white rule in central and
southern Africa after the Second World War.
* * * * *
The literature on decolonization in the Belgian Congo leading to its
independence on  June  is both admirable and comprehensive:
it deals with the dynamics in both the Congolese and Belgian camps
during the Belgians’ hasty withdrawal; the impact of the cold war and
the superpowers on events in the Congo; the succession of conflicts
that followed the end of Belgian rule leading to the collapse of civil
society (and infrastructure); the involvement of Belgium in the Congo
after independence; the role of United Nations (UN) peace-keeping
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forces; and the secession of Katanga in July .1 There is also on-
going interest in the death of the Congolese prime minister, Patrice
Lumumba, whom Ludo de Witte accuses agents of the Belgian govern-
ment of murdering in January .2
Missing from this corpus, however, is an in-depth analysis of the role
played by the neighbouring Central African Federation. Even Alan
James, who examines the links between Britain, the Federation, and
the Congo, focuses primarily on Britain’s role in the struggle in the
Congo. As he explains, ‘the literature on the Congo is voluminous.
That on Britain’s part in the crisis is to all intents and purposes non-
existent.’3 The gap is even more apparent when looking at the Feder-
ation’s relations with the Congo: there is no relevant material in
Portuguese, and French-language works focus on Belgium’s role in the
crisis.4 Meanwhile, in English, with the exception of James and articles
that touch obliquely upon the subject, the relevant works – such as
J. R. T. Wood’s edition of the prime minister of the Federation, Sir
Roy Welensky’s, papers – focus primarily on events within the Feder-
ation.5 The exception is the interest shown in the death of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld, in
September  in an aeroplane crash near the Northern Rhodesian
airfield of Ndola while attempting to broker a deal to end Katangan
1 See R. Anstey, ‘Belgian Rule in the Congo and the Aspirations of the “Évolué” Class’, in Colonial-
ism in Africa, -: II: The History and Politics of Colonialism, -, ed. P. Duignan and L. H.
Gann (Cambridge, ); Che in Africa: Che Guevara’s Congo Diary, ed. W. Galvez (Melbourne,
); J. Gérard-Libois, Katanga Secession (Madison, ); J. D. Hargreaves, Decolonization in Africa
(London, ); R. Holland, European Decolonisation, -: An Introductory Survey (London, );
I. Kabongo, ‘The Catastrophe of Belgian Decolonization’, in Decolonization and African Independence:
The Transfer of Power, -, ed. P. Gifford and W. R. Louis (New Haven, ); M. G. Kalb, The
Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa – From Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York, ); E. W. Lefever,
Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action (Washington, DC, ); C. C. O’Brien, To
Katanga and Back: A UN Case History (London, ); J. Stengers, ‘Precipitous Decolonisation: The
Case of the Belgian Congo’, in The Transfer of Power in Africa, ed. W. R. Louis and P. Gifford (New
Haven, ); S. R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, - (Ithaca, ); and M.
Crawford Young, ‘Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi’, in The Cambridge History of Africa: VIII: From c.
 to c., ed. M. Crowder (Cambridge, ).
2 L. de Witte, De Moord op Lumumba (Leuven, ), pp. -. De Witte’s book has been pub-
lished in English as The Assassination of Lumumba (London, ). For Lumumba’s murder, see also
‘Files Show UK Backed Murder Plot’ and ‘Chronicle of a Death’, The Guardian,  June . See
also, T. R. Kanza, Conflict in the Congo: The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba (London, ) and
J.-C. Willame, Patrice Lumumba: la crise congolaise revisitée (Paris, ).
3 A. James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, - (Basingstoke, ), p. xvi.
4 I thank Malyn Newitt and Patrick Chabal for this information. The work on Portugal’s role tends to
concentrate on the counter-insurgency campaigns in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau from
the late s, after the period examined in this article. An example of this is I. Beckett, ‘The
Portuguese Army: The Campaign in Mozambique, -’, in Armed Forces and Modern Counter-
Insurgency, ed. I. Beckett and J. Pimlott (New York, ). In French, see the excellent collection,
Congo, -, ed. J. Gérard-Libois et al. (Brussels and Leopoldville, -).
5 N. White, ‘The Business and Politics of Decolonisation: The British Experience in the Twentieth
Century’, Economic History Review, liii (), -; P. Murphy, ‘Intelligence and Decolonisation:
The Life and Death of the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau, -’, Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, xxix (May ), - and ‘Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence
Culture: The View from Central Africa’, Intelligence and National Security, xvii (), -; and
J. R. T. Wood, The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Durban,
).
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secession. Such works, usually investigative journalism implicating the
Federation in Hammarskjöld’s death, shed little light on its activities in
the Congo.1 As the British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, told
Welensky: ‘It is hard indeed that you should have to endure sugges-
tions from various quarters that Hammarskjöld’s death was in some
way brought about by a plot organised by us, for which you provided
the means.’2 Indeed, most of the work on Hammarskjöld’s death fits
the category of conspiracy theories that often emerge following the
violent death of a famous person in murky circumstances.3
One would expect the Federation to be worried about what might
happen in the Congo, Katanga in particular, when Belgium made the
sudden decision to withdraw as the colonial power in the late s.4
Established in , and, from , headed by Welensky, the Feder-
ation was a ten-year association that tied together Northern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland, managed by the Colonial Office, with Southern Rho-
desia (now Zimbabwe), managed by the Commonwealth Relations
Office. Southern Rhodesia, technically a Crown colony, had enjoyed
de facto self-government since . The Federation represented its
attempt to dominate Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and their
majority black populations: its capital was Salisbury, also the capital of
Southern Rhodesia, and political gerrymandering ensured white con-
trol.5 In its protection of the economically dominant minority group –
the white settlers – the Federation is comparable to the East Africa
High Commission, with the difference that whereas the Federation was
both an economic and a political union, only economic integration was
envisaged for British East Africa.6
The Federation, autonomous in practice, had both a long-standing
economic association with and a political interest in Katanga. The
economic connection stretched back to  when Cecil Rhodes,
1 For accusations of skulduggery in Hammarskjöld’s death, see Home to Welensky, c. Oct. 
[Oxford, Rhodes House Library], Welensky Papers /. That Hammarskjöld’s death might not be
an accident was widely discussed in the press at the time and continues to attract interest: G. I.
Smith, ‘Mercenaries Accused of Killing Hammarskjöld’, The Observer,  May ; H. Debelius,
‘Tshombe Linked with Hammarskjöld Death’, The Times,  Feb. ; D. Pallister, ‘Mercenaries
Blamed for Death of UN Head in Air Crash in Northern Rhodesia’, The Guardian,  Sept. ;
C. C. O’Brien, ‘Foul Play on the Albertina’, The Guardian,  Sept. ; letter to The Guardian
from G. I. Smith,  Sept. ; letter to The Guardian from B. Rosio,  March ; M. Evans,
‘West “Plotted to Kill” UN Chief ’, The Times,  Aug. ; C. Coulter, ‘O’Brien Dismisses Ham-
marskjöld Plot’, Irish Times,  Aug. ; C. C. O’Brien, Memoir: My Life and Themes (London,
), pp. -, -. See also, Wood, Welensky Papers, pp. -  and [Oxford, Bodleian
Library,] Smith Papers, MSS Eng. e..
2 Macmillan to Welensky,  Sept.  [London, Public Record Office, Records of the] PR[im]E
M[inister] /.
3 For a recent discussion, see M. Hughes, Diary, London Review of Books, xxiii ( Aug. ), -.
4 While Belgium formally made the decision to withdraw from the Congo in Jan. , new policy
initiatives in the late s were a portent of the decision to quit the Congo in . Belgian officials,
civil and military, and Belgian civilians continued to work, reside, and direct events in the Congo
after the formal withdrawal in June .
5 Murphy, ‘Intelligence and Decolonisation’, p. .
6 A. Adedeji, ‘The Economic Evolution of Developing Africa’, in Cambridge History of Africa: VIII,
ed. Crowder, p. .
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determined to have a share in Katanga’s mineral riches, set up Tan-
ganyika Concessions Ltd (or ‘Tanks’), which promptly sent an expedi-
tion north into Katanga to stake out claims to mineral rights. In
response, the Belgian Comité Special du Katanga (CSK) agreed to
share Katanga’s wealth –  per cent CSK to  per cent ‘Tanks’ –
and to develop mining as a separate concern. The jointly run Union
Minière du Haut Katanga came into being in  as a collaboration
between British and Belgian capitalists who, together, provided the
initial capital.1 Inextricably joined, the two companies shared reports,
correspondence, directors, dividends and shares, letterhead, and
auditors.2 British money flowed in and out of Union Minière and
British directors sat on the board until the s. Captain Charles
Waterhouse, formerly a Conservative member of parliament and a
frequent visitor to the foreign office during the Congo crisis, was both
the chairman of ‘Tanks’ and a director of the Union Minière.3 Other
British members of Union Minière’s board of directors at the time of
the Congo crisis included Sir Ulick Alexander and Lord Selborne,
while important British firms such as Unilever, the British-American
Tobacco Company, and Shell Oil had large holdings in Katanga.4
The links between the British and Belgian governments, ‘Tanks’, the
Union Minière, and the Federation led to the formation of a ‘Katanga
lobby’, a shadowy group of businessmen and politicians keen to keep
control of the wealth they derived from white rule in Africa. James
describes the lobby as an ‘important and sometimes influential pres-
sure group’, and even though it had no formal structure, among its
leading members were Waterhouse and the marquess of Salisbury, a
leading critic after  of Macmillan’s Africa policy and one of the
most influential members of the Conservative Party.5 The ‘Katanga
lobby’ found its political allies among the reactionary backbench Con-
servative MPs who had rebelled over the retreat from Suez and in the
Federation, owing to their obvious admiration for Welensky.6 The
group’s existence was pinpointed by the US under-secretary of state
for economic affairs in the John F. Kennedy administration, George
Ball, in a memorandum for the president written after a bout of fight-
ing in the Congo in : ‘the Macmillan Government should be able
to free itself from the pressures of City and Conservative groups in the
1 S. Hempstone, Katanga Report (London, ), pp. -; F. Coleman, The Northern Rhodesia Cop-
perbelt, - (Manchester, ), p. ; ‘Summary of the Memorial “-” Issued by Union
Minière du Haut-Katanga on the Occasion of Its Fiftieth Anniversary ()’, p. .
2 See T[anganyika] C[oncessions] U[nion] M[inière]  Usines Lubumbashi  and TC  Union
Minière (in the latter especially TC to Count Guy de Baillet Latour of UMHK,  June ; repre-
sentative of Tanganyika Concessions to Scotland,  Jan. ; and UMHK AGM of shareholders, 
July , in [Manchester, John Rylands University Library], Tanganyika Concessions Group
Archive.
3 White, ‘Business and Politics of Decolonisation’, pp. -, .
4 James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, p. .
5 Ibid., p. xii. See also White, ‘Business and Politics of Decolonisation’, p. .
6 Hempstone, Katanga Report, p. ; N. Fisher, Iain Macleod (London, ) p. .
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UK and the Rhodesias and join with us in trying to bring about a
peaceful reunification of the Congo.’1 This, however, was more easily
said than done.
Katanga’s communications and prosperity were tied to Rhodesia’s.
Coal from the Wankie fields in Southern Rhodesia fed Katanga’s
furnaces, and British-run railways, both through the Federation and
Portuguese Angola, carried the bulk of Katanga’s imports and exports:
they were an obvious symbol of the intimate economic relationship
between the two.2 In -, when the Congo’s infrastructure col-
lapsed after the Belgians’ departure, Federation railways and the
British-run Benguela railway through Angola exported all of Katanga’s
mineral production.3
The profits from the economic exploitation of central and southern
Africa depended on the maintenance of direct or indirect white polit-
ical rule in central and southern Africa. But even before Macmillan’s
speech in Cape Town on  February  announcing a ‘wind of
change’ bringing decolonization to Africa, black African nationalism
and British government pragmatism were undermining the foundations
of white rule.4 The granting of independence to Ghana in 
foreshadowed independence for Britain’s colonies in central and east
Africa – all of them became independent in the s – and threatened
to destabilize the Federation.5 This shift in Britain’s stance encouraged
the whites in the Federation to make common cause with fellow white
settler communities in Angola and Mozambique, South Africa, and
Katanga, in the hope that, by standing together, they could throw up a
barrier to black Africa, both internally to demands for political reform,
and externally, from the newly independent African states to the
north.6 Conor Cruise O’Brien, an Irish diplomat whom the United
Nations posted to Katanga, set out the predicament of the Feder-
ation’s whites in the foreword he wrote for a radical attack on colonial-
ism published in : ‘In Katanga, I came to feel that I was living at
the point where the “wind of change” begins to veer: that is, the point
where it encounters the escarpment of a relatively solid area of Euro-
pean settlement and rule. The , or so Europeans of Katanga felt
themselves to be backed by the , or so of the Rhodesias and by
more than ,, in South Africa.’7 Thus, the Federation’s Com-
mittee for the Consideration of External Policy in Relation to the
1 Memo, Ball to Kennedy,  Sept. , in F[oreign] R[elations of the] U[nited] S[tates]: XX: [Congo
Crisis], p.  .
2 N. Pollock, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia: Corridor to the North (Pittsburgh, ), p. .
3 Hempstone, Katanga Report, p. .
4 Fisher, Macleod, p. .
5 Ibid., Somalia (), Tanzania (), Uganda (), Kenya (), Zambia (), Malawi
(), and Botswana ().
6 Gérard-Libois, Katangan Secession, p. .
7 Introduction by C. C. O’Brien to R. Ainslie, The Unholy Alliance: Salazar-Verwoerd-Welensky
(London, ), p. .
The Congo Crisis 
Defence of the Federation, set up in the late s, recommended ‘the
advisability of entering into a defence commitment or understanding
with the Portuguese and South Africans on the basis that, despite the
differences which separated our policies, the geographical facts of our
position indicated that we would either stand or fall together in meet-
ing a movement which sought to remove European influence from
Africa.’1
Welensky’s administration was keen to create a NATO-style defence
pact for southern Africa – the African Treaty Organization (ATO) –
with the Federation as a leading member.2 From , the head of the
Federation’s security service, the Federal Intelligence and Security
Bureau (FISB), Basil (Bob) de Quehen, rationalized such an organiza-
tion by comparing it to the South-East Asian Treaty Organization
(SEATO), founded in  to contain Soviet expansion.3 Hoping to
ride on the coat-tails of the containment and, after the Korean War,
‘rollback’ of Communism, the final version of Welensky’s proposal for
a defence pact, in December , tried to enveigle Britain and the
United States into supporting the Federation by attributing African
nationalism to Soviet sponsorship. Had he succeeded, the organization
would have thrown up a cordon sanitaire across central Africa. As
Welensky explained: ‘It will be seen from this suggestion that I have in
mind the creation of a firm line stretching across the ° parallel and
running from Ruvuma River, on the East Coast, across the northern
boundary of Mocambique, the Federation and Angola to Cabinda,
south of Pointe Noire, on the west coast of Africa. I have in mind that
the pact which would establish this line would be kept top secret.’4 In
fact, Welensky hoped to create a glacis to the north of this line: ‘it
might well be to the advantage of Brussels to require the future
government or governments of the Congo to subscribe to the pact so
that the West might retain some degree of control over the Congo’s
external affairs.’5 For similar reasons, French Madagascar and French
Equatorial Africa might be asked to join.6
Britain’s lack of interest in the idea of a regional defence pact
prompted Welensky to pursue an alternative strategy of a bilateral
defence pact with Portuguese Africa.7 As early as November , he
1 Committee for the Consideration of External Policy in Relation to the Defence of the Federation,
 Sept, . Annex: ‘An Examination of the Factors Likely to Shape the External Policies and
Defence of the Federation, September ’, Welensky Papers, /.
2 See memo,  Dec.  [London, Public Record Office], C[olonial] O[ffice Records] /.
3 See letters and reports, Welensky Papers, /.
4 Memo, Welensky,  Dec.  [London, Public Record Office], CAB[inet Records] /.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. See also AT (FED) ,  Dec. , Prime Minister’s Visit to Africa, Jan. , Sir R.
Welensky’s Proposal for an African Defence Pact, Additional Brief by the CRO, CAB /.
7 ‘Sir Roy Welensky’s Proposal for Defence Talks with the Portuguese’, n.d. [c. Jan. ] in
‘Proposed Talks between the Federal Government of Rhodesia and the Portuguese Government’,
CAB /. For the British response, see note for PM by CRO,   Jan. , CO / and
Prime Minister’s Visit to Africa, Jan. , Sir R. Welensky’s Proposal for an African Defence Pact,
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had met the Portuguese dictator, António de Oliveira Salazar, to dis-
cuss how best to link the Federation with its neighbours, the Portu-
guese colonies of Angola and Mozambique. He suggested that all three
should jam radio broadcasts from Egypt to help in containing the
spread of Soviet influence,1 and when the Portuguese seemed keen,
Welensky put the idea to Macmillan in May . But Macmillan,
who was no more interested than he had been in the idea of a defence
pact, merely agreed to mull it over.2
Welensky’s proposed defence pact with the Portuguese concentrated
on issues such as joint military and security planning, improved
communications, and counter-propaganda, as well as better trade links
designed to integrate the economies of the Federation and Portuguese
Africa.3 He was confident that Portugal would at least build connec-
tions with the Federation, especially in the ‘context of controlling sub-
version’.4 Thus, when events in the Congo overtook the negotiations,
the Portuguese authorities in Angola worked closely with the Feder-
ation in the Congo in the early s.
At the same time as the Federation was negotiating with the Portu-
guese, it proposed a political union with Katanga. Indeed, in ,
long before the Belgian government announced its plans to withdraw
from the Congo, the settlers in Katanga had suggested a merger with
the Federation.5 Talks between the two sides intensified in late 
and early  when a ‘European group from Katanga’ and senior
figures from the Federation met to discuss ‘questions of common
interest posed by the accession of the Congo to independence’.6 As a
British secret service report noted in December , Welensky played
a key role in the discussions: ‘He [Welensky] told me that he had
recently received a secret delegation from the Katanga area … This
delegation had asked him whether, if certain political developments
took place in the Congo, the Katanga area might be received into the
Central [African] Federation.’7
The white settlers in the Federation regarded a united black Congo
in control of Katanga as a ‘grim warning’ of what might happen if
Britain gave independence to any of the Federation’s territories.8 The
sudden decision by Belgium in January  to withdraw from the
Congo and grant independence within six months made the talks with
        
Additional Brief by the Commonwealth Relations Office,  Dec. , CO /.
1 Note of conversation, Welensky and Salazar,  Nov.  [London, Public Record Office],
F[oreign Office Records] /. See also, Welensky to Macmillan,  Dec. , CAB /.
2 Notes of mtg., Welensky and prime minister,  May , PREM /; memo, Stephen to
Bligh,  May . in ‘Proposed Talks between the Federal Government of Rhodesia and the
Portuguese Government’, CAB /.
3 Sir Roy Welensky’s Proposal for Defence Talks with the Portuguese, CAB /.
4 Ibid.
5 Cutting from The Times,  March , FO /.
6 Gérard-Libois, Katangan Secession, p. .
7 Report, British SIS officer (MI), ‘Notes on a Visit to Africa’,  Dec. , PREM /.
8 M. Garnett, Alport: A Study in Loyalty (Teddington, ) p. .
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the Belgians in Katanga more urgent: the Federation faced the pros-
pect in June of a black-run administration in a neighbouring province
geographically and culturally akin to the ‘Copperbelt’ zone of the over-
whelmingly black Northern Rhodesia. In March , three months
before the hand-over of power in Leopoldville, the local Katangan
paper, the Echo du Katanga, reported that the Rhodesians were pro-
posing a new federation to be made up of Katanga, Northern and
Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Mozambique, or that Katanga
could join the existing Federation. The press speculated that the
Belgian government would support the merger.1 The same month, the
Belgian consul-general in Salisbury, Etienne Harford, told Welensky
that the Belgian government suggested that, when the Congo became
independent, Katanga should enter into a ‘political association’ with
the Federation.2 The Rhodesia Herald confirmed Harford’s offer: not
only the settlers and mining companies of Katanga, but also the Bel-
gian government wanted a political union that would allow the settlers
to carry on business as usual after independence.3
In March, Welensky revealed in an interview with Rene MacColl, a
reporter with the Daily Express, based in London, that Katanga might
well join the Federation. When MacColl asked him if there would be a
political tie with a break-away Katanga:
‘Yes’ rejoined Sir Roy – then added characteristically and with a twinkling eye:
‘Now I suppose there is going to be the hell of a row for my having told you
this … Suggestions have been made to me – I got the latest letter on the sub-
ject only yesterday from a source which I had better not name – that the feder-
ation should “hold out the hand of friendship” to Katanga when the Congo
gains its independence.’4
A supportive editorial summed up the mood of the paper: ‘If
Katanga decided to become a state in the federation, its mineral wealth
would be linked with the copper, coal, and water power of Northern
and Southern Rhodesia. Central Africa would be better off and
therefore nearer freedom. Sir Roy Welensky’s ideal would be closer to
realisation.’5 With whom exactly was Welensky negotiating? According
to MacColl, the talks had been inspired by mining groups; meanwhile,
‘the Daily Express let it be understood that the approaches had not
been made by representatives of the , Europeans in the province,
nor by the powerful Union Minière, but by Moise Tshombe, the
Conakat leader.’6
1 Cutting, Echo du Katanga,  March , FO  /. See also, Smith Papers, MSS Eng.
c., ff. - (pp. -).
2 ‘Katanga – Sir Roy Confers’, The [Rhodesian] Evening Standard,  March , Welensky Papers,
/.
3 ‘Katanga to Link with Federation’, Rhodesia Herald,  March , Welensky Papers, /.
4 ‘There’s going to be hell because I’ve told you this – Rene MacColl interviews Sir Roy Welensky’,
Daily Express,  March .
5 Editorial, Daily Express,  March .
6 Gérard-Libois, Katangan Secession, pp. -.
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When the issue of Katanga joining the Federation was raised in Lon-
don, officials noted that Welensky had received letters urging collabor-
ation from sources he declined to name; these were almost surely
Belgian settlers keen to join the Federation, and who were intimately
associated with mining interests in Katanga, including the powerful
Union Minière.1 Belgian diplomatic staff told their British counterparts
that the Union Minière was utterly opposed to a black-run Katanga:
‘Should such a prospect arise, they would seriously consider the
possibility of seeking the amalgamation of the Katanga with Northern
Rhodesia.’ The Belgian diplomats added how, for years, there had
been close contacts between the white settlers of Katanga and North-
ern Rhodesia.2
The local press seized on these reports of an alliance. On  March
, the Rhodesia Herald recorded that the fear of an independent
black Congo was driving Katanga into a union with the Federation.
This news came as no surprise in the Federation with the Rhodesia
Herald reporting that many Rhodesian MPs ‘were offering bets that
Katanga would soon be Federal controlled. They admitted yesterday
morning that on Tuesday they had heard rumours of an approach
having been made to … Welensky … from a source which the Prime
Minister was not prepared to disclose.’3 At the same time, in the
Northern News, Welensky maintained that ‘certain circles’ in Katanga
had approached him and that he made it clear to the group that he
favoured some form of amalgamation.4 Further confirmation came in
another article in the Rhodesia Herald:
Police are investigating a new but powerful Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia
alliance group which is busy canvassing support on the Copperbelt. The new
organisation – Fetrikat – is affiliated to the powerful Conakat Party and has its
headquarters at Elisabethville. The group promises access to the Congo after
June  only to members. The group is electing ‘reliable’ people to its ranks. It
seeks alliance between the Haut Katanga Province and Northern Rhodesia’s
Western Province which includes the Copperbelt.5
* * * * *
Why did a political union between the Federation and Katanga never
materialize? The answer can be found in both external and internal
1 Note on parliamentary question by the Viscount Stansgate on report of a political association be-
tween Katanga and Rhodesian Federation, - March , Government’s response to question to
be given by Viscount Hailsham on  March , FO /.
2 Embassy, Bogotá, to Boothby (FO),  Feb. , FO /. See also, ‘“Federal Katanga”
Move Was No Shock in SR’, Northern News,  March , Welensky Papers, /.
3 ‘Katanga Africans Fear Future – Hence Hints at Federal Links’, Rhodesia Herald,  March ,
FO /.
4 ‘Sir Roy Maintains that Congo “Circles” Approached Him on Katanga’, Northern News,  March
, Welensky Papers, /.
5 ‘Police Probe Activities of Copperbelt Congo Group’, Rhodesia Herald,  June , Welensky
Papers, /.
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factors. Externally, Britain, the United States, and the United Nations,
keen to maintain the integrity of the Congo, worked together to
prevent the loss of Katanga, Congo’s richest province. There were also
internal factors limiting Welensky’s actions. At about the same time as
Belgium was making the decision to pull out of the Congo, serious
rioting erupted among the black population of Nyasaland, and there
were further disturbances in Northern Rhodesia. In March , the
governor, Sir Robert Armitage, declared a state of emergency in
Nyasaland and imprisoned the black leader, Hastings Banda. Fol-
lowing these disturbances, Britain appointed the Monckton Commis-
sion to inquire into the future of the Federation, and held a conference
at Lancaster House in early  that brought together Welensky and
African nationalists such as Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesia
and the recently released Banda. The conference achieved nothing, but
Welensky could see that the talks with leaders such as Banda were ‘the
beginning of the end’.1 Led by Iain Macleod, the secretary of state for
the colonies, Britain was pushing for independence for Nyasaland and
Northern Rhodesia, something that both countries achieved in .
Much as Welensky favoured a union with Katanga, the gradual
destruction of the Federation and the future of white rule in the region
were more pressing concerns. He was fighting a political rearguard
action, attempting, for instance, to block the deployment of British
troops to Nyasaland whom he felt would aid Britain’s policy of inde-
pendence for black Africans.2 When Macmillan visited the Federation
in January , Welensky found him to be ‘bland and unrepentant’
on Britain’s new policy towards its African possessions;3 angered by the
Conservatives’ lack of support for his administration, Welensky, it has
been argued, threatened a coup d’état in February  if Africans were
put in control in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.4 The constitu-
tional future of the Federation dominated Welensky’s agenda in late
 and ; pressed by Britain and African nationalists, his admin-
istration tried, unsuccessfully, to preserve the Federation created in
. As Lord Alport, British high commissioner to the Federation,
recalled, the ‘excitement and flurry’ of Katanga was a side-show in
which Welensky escaped or temporarily avoided ‘the less interesting
but perhaps more difficult problems of the constitutional future’.5
With the Federation collapsing, it made little sense for Welensky
to gamble on an overt political or military adventure to support a
secessionist movement in Katanga that all the major world powers
and international organizations opposed. Neither was there internal
1 Wood, Welensky Papers, p. .
2 Macleod to prime minister,  July , PREM //-. See also, CO /.
3 Wood, Welensky Papers, p. .
4 H. Franklin, Unholy Wedlock: The Failure of the Central African Federation (London, ) pp. ,
.
5 Alport to Garner (CRO),  Jan.  [Colchester, University of Essex], Alport Papers, box , file
.
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support in the Federation from the majority black population for
Katangan secession: blacks in Northern Rhodesia watched with
‘satisfaction’ as desperate Belgian settlers from Katanga streamed over
the border seeking sanctuary and a haven from the anarchy in the
Congo after July .1 Neither were the Rhodesian armed forces
strong enough to maintain order within the Federation while also de-
ploying north into Katanga to support any attempt at political union.
The Rhodesian army order-of-battle in  – when it was a stronger
force following reforms instituted by Welensky – was two regular bat-
talions (one ‘European’ – the Rhodesian Light Infantry – and one
‘African’ – the Rhodesian African Rifles); a Special Air Service
squadron; eight Territorial (TA) battalions (the Royal Rhodesian Regi-
ment); and one TA artillery regiment. This represented a total strength
of , regulars and , TA reservists.2 Responsible for a huge
landmass covering , square miles of rough terrain with poor
communications, the fully stretched force had little or nothing in the
way of a reserve able to deploy into the expanse of Katanga. In normal
circumstances, the Federation could call on the considerable strength
of the British armed forces in an emergency, but this was not possible
considering Britain’s differences with the Federation over both a
political union with Katanga and the future status of the Federation.
As the editor of Welensky’s papers noted, following a meeting between
Macmillan and Welensky in May : ‘Macmillan’s constant harping
on British military involvement arose out of more than a concern for
the Federation. A sizeable force would have given Whitehall the means
to influence policy in the Federation which the current Federal control
of the armed forces denied to it.’3
Aware of his weakness, Welensky tried to upgrade his armed forces:
he instituted reforms to increase the strength of the army and brought
in some new equipment such as Ferret armoured cars, modern
machine-guns, and Belgian FN semi-automatic rifles to replace the
Second World War-vintage weapons in use in .4 The federal
cabinet in July  recognized that its army was inadequate to deal
with both further disturbances in Nyasaland and ‘any intensification of
tribal clashes in Katanga’.5 Moreover, the cost of the extra spending on
defence in case there was a spill-over of trouble in Katanga into
Northern Rhodesia following Belgium’s departure was estimated at
£,, as an initial outlay, plus £, as recurrent expendi-
ture.6 As the federal cabinet noted, this ‘would tax the country’s
1 Wood, Welensky Papers, p. .
2 Details [London, Public Record Office], F[oreign and] C[ommonwealth] O[ffice Records] /.
3 Wood, Welensky Papers, p. .
4 Ibid., p. .
5 Minutes, federal cabinet, FGC() th mtg., conclusions of a special meeting …  July ,
Welensky, Barrow, Coldicott, Owen, Goldberg, and Graylin present, Welensky Papers, /.
6 Minutes, federal cabinet, FGC(), th mtg., annexure entitled Strengthening of Defence Forces
in Conclusions of a Meeting held in the Cabinet Room,  July , Welensky Papers, /.
The Congo Crisis 
financial resources to the utmost, but it was felt that that position
would have to be faced’.1
Once Katanga under Tshombe seceded from the Congo in July
, Welensky urged Britain to sanction the deployment of Feder-
ation troops to help Tshombe. Welensky saw in Tshombe’s secession-
ist Katanga a local ally, a pro-Western breakaway state that would help
preserve white rule in the region.2 Knowing that Britain’s response
would be negative, Welensky still reserved the option of using his
forces in any role that best served the interests of the Federation.3 But
the deployment of Federation troops outside the borders of the Feder-
ation in anything other than small advisory teams was impossible, con-
sidering the limited size of the force and its primary role in maintaining
order within an increasingly turbulent Federation. Faced with the im-
practicability of a political union with Katanga backed by Federation
military force, Welensky shifted his policy towards Katanga, providing
less overt and indirect support in the form of economic, military, and
political support for Tshombe and an independent Katanga.4 As a US
special report from  noted: ‘White settlers in Northern Rhodesia
and Angola fear an extension of the Congo’s disorder into their areas.
To prevent this, they are willing to give some political support and to
countenance the passage of some military supplies, mercenaries, and
advisers to Tshombe. They are also willing to grant Katanga continued
access to the sea for its exports.’5
While unable or unwilling to use its troops in Katanga to help
Tshombe resist military attempts by the United Nations to force him
back into the framework of a united Congo, the Federation (and South
Africa) became the recruiting ground and forward base for a largely
white mercenary force that was deployed in Katanga as Tshombe’s
private army. These mercenaries opposed and fought UN forces in the
province that were trying to re-integrate Katanga.6 Largely paid for out
of the Katangan budget – ,. million Katangese francs in  was
spent on mercenaries – this force was initially composed of French
and Belgians (who deservedly earned the sobriquet les affreux) but, by
, the focus of recruitment had shifted from Paris and Brussels to
1 Minutes, federal cabinet, FGC(), th mtg., annexure entitled Strengthening of Defence Forces
in Conclusions of a Meeting held in the Cabinet Room,  July , Welensky Papers, /.
2 Message to sec. of state for Commonwealth Relations from the Federal Prime Minister – handed to
High Commission in Salisbury,  July , Welensky Papers, /.
3 ‘Note on Opposition Question in the House of Lords on  July  on How Welensky Would
Use His Forces’, Welensky Papers, /.
4 In Aug. , in response to appeals from Tshombe for military support, the Salisbury government
prevaricated, worried that any overt flow of arms would soon become common knowledge and so
discredit the CAF in the international arena (from Barrow, minister for home affairs, CAF to
Macmillan following conversation with Tshombe’s special envoy, M. Onckelinx,  Aug. ,
Welensky Papers, /).
5 Special National Intelligence Estimate,  Dec. , quoted in FRUS , xx. .
6 See S. J. G. Clarke, The Congo Mercenaries: A History and Analysis (Johannesburg, ). See also,
‘Britain Under Guard Tells: How I Raised a Pocket Army’, Daily Express,  June , FO /
.
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Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Seeing Tshombe a bulwark for
the whites of the Federation, Welensky, despite repeated requests from
Britain and the United Nations, failed to halt the recruitment of mer-
cenaries in Salisbury and Bulawayo.1 Not just the United Nations but
also the local press commented on the recruitment drives for mercen-
aries in Southern Rhodesia after .2 Often done out of hotel bars,3
this recruitment seems to have included ex-Rhodesian army person-
nel;4 indeed, two Rhodesian Light Infantry soldiers, Firth and Damer,
picked up by the United Nations in Katanga, claimed they had had no
trouble getting past the Federation border authorities. As the British
consul in Katanga concluded: ‘It would seem reasonable to ask the
military authorities in Rhodesia to place Katanga out of bounds to
their personnel on leave, in present circumstances. Firth and Damer
held leave passes from their commanding officer and assured me that
they had come here with his knowledge.’5
The Congolese authorities, other African states, and the United
Nations repeatedly blamed the Rhodesians for the mercenary problem.
The UN mission to the Congolese foreign minister reported back in
 how ‘it will be recalled that Captain Wicks [a mercenary officer]
was staff officer [état-major] within the contingent of South African
mercenaries attached to the Katangan Gendarmerie and was actively
engaged in the recruitment of men for this contingent in South Africa
and Rhodesia.’6 Two months later, another UN officer, Brian Ur-
quhart, made similar comments that were passed back to the foreign
office: ‘he [Urquhart] had little doubt, in view of the volume of reports
reaching the United Nations, that a good deal of questionable activity
was indeed taking place on the Rhodesian side of the frontier.’7 The
Nigerian foreign minister, Jaja Wachuku, made the same point when
he appeared on an American television panel discussion in October
, articulating the view held by many newly independent African
states on the Federation’s involvement in Katanga.8
Even British officials, some of whom felt sympathy with the whites
of the Federation, noted the wilful nature of Federation activities in
Katanga. Thus, the British ambassador in the Congo in , Sir
D. M. H. Riches, sent back a note to the foreign office on the issue of
black gendarmes from Tshombe’s force who were using Northern
Rhodesia as a safe-haven to escape Katanga:
1 Clarke, Congo Mercenaries, ch. , pp. , .
2 Extracts from Sunday Mail ( April ) and Herald ( April), encl. in High Com. (Salisbury) to
CRO,  April , FO /.
3 UK mission at UN to FO,  April , FO /. See also, response to office of the high
commissioner in Salisbury to CRO,  May , FO /.
4 Riches (Leopoldville) to FO,  Sept. , FO /.
5 Dunnett (Elisabethville) to FO,  March , FO /.
6 Officer-in-charge of the United Nations mission to the minister of foreign affairs of the Congo, 
Aug. , FO /.
7 UK mission at UN to Wilford (FO),  Oct. , FO /.
8 Ormsby Gore (Washington) to FO,  Oct. , FO /.
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I assumed that it [a reference to an exchange of telegrams] was an answer to
the Central African Office’s telegram No.  of November  and that what it
was saying was that the Northern Rhodesian authorities have no intention of
departing from their present practice in dealing with ex-gendarmes crossing
the border from Katanga and are not prepared to go even so far as to make one
or two token hand-overs to show they accept the Congolese position. If this is
correct, it is very disappointing. The Congolese will not understand any more
than I do, why armed intruders into Northern Rhodesian territory cannot be
handed back to them; or if there are insuperable legal obstacles to that, why
they cannot be warned in advance when and where the intruders are to be put
across the border so that they can be on the other side to meet them. Refusal
to go even this far would look to them at the best like over-scrupulous
legalism, and at the worst like deliberate connivance at rebellion.1
Even when the Federation authorities under pressure did restrict
mercenary recruitment – as they did at times – this led to a temporary
displacement of mercenary recruitment, usually to South Africa, and
all the while there was the question of overly lax visa controls that
allowed mercenaries from South Africa and Europe to pass unhindered
through the Federation, using it as a convenient transit point for travel
to Katanga.2 When responding to reports of Belgians passing through
the Federation, the latter professed that it could do nothing to stop
anyone who had legal travel documents from transiting the Feder-
ation.3 However, further British reports showed that the Rhodesians
were allowing passengers travelling with the Belgian airline Sabena to
land at Ndola in Northern Rhodesia close to the Katanga border with-
out visas. As one CRO official concluded, if the Federation confirmed
that this was the case, ‘there will now be virtually no control over the
possible entry of mercenaries into Katanga via the Federation and that
the present arrangement whereby all transit visa applications are re-
ferred to Salisbury, appears to be valueless.’4 There is also evidence
that the Federation colluded with Belgian and Union Minière officials
over mercenary recruitment and passage to Katanga. For instance, it
was reported that recruitment in Salisbury was carried out by one
Monsieur Bogard, a former employee of Union Minière.5 Moreover,
Marcel Hambursen, a Belgian industrialist from Namur responsible for
mercenary recruitment – for which the French authorities sentenced
him to a year in jail – travelled without any hindrance through the
Federation on his trips to and from Katanga.6
The forward staging post and safe-haven for the mercenaries was the
border town of Ndola. It is perhaps for this reason that so many
1 Rose (Leopoldville) to Millard (FO),  Dec. , FO /.
2 A. Mockler, Mercenaries (London, ), pp. -.
3 Riches (Leopoldville) to Boothby (FO),  Jan. , FO /.
4 Browne (CRO) to Scott (Salisbury),  Aug. , FO /.
5 Riches (Leopoldville) to FO,  Oct. , FO /.
6 Scott to Evans, home affairs, Salisbury,  April , FO /. For jail sentence, see ‘ Mois
de prison avec sursis à l’ex lieutenant Ropagnol’, Le Monde,  July .
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conspiracy theories emerged when Hammarskjöld died in September
 near the town. After all, as UN Secretary-General, he was flying
into one of the main centres of opposition to the UN operation to re-
integrate Katanga: not only English-speaking mercenaries, but also
French soldiers-of-fortune such as Colonel Roger Trinquier 1 used
Ndola as a convenient meeting point when liaising with Katangan of-
ficials from Tshombe’s ministry.2 The US military attaché in Leopold-
ville, after noting the presence of suspicious aircraft at Ndola airfield,
had breakfast in the airport canteen; at an adjoining table were ‘eight
or nine Europeans of whom some were wearing Katanga emblems.
Three of these he recognised as having been pointed out to him on a
previous occasion by Colonel Egge [of the UN force in the Congo] as
being ex-mercenaries. Some of this group left the table saying that they
now had to catch the aircraft to Kolwezi. The conversation was in
French.’3 The reference to warplanes at Ndola tallies with UN reports
accusing the Federation of using Ndola as an airbase for Katangan
warplanes: ‘In this regard I might call to your attention that although
Sir Roy has vigorously tried to explain away the crossing of the 
jeeps at Kipushi, he has never made any public reference to the
activities of the Dornier aircraft based at Ndola and piloted by one Mr
Wickstead – probably because the evidence we presented was too
convincing for Sir Roy to deny.’4 The capture in Katanga in September
 of the landlord of Ndola’s Elephant and Castle public house, a
Mr Catchpole, by UN forces during a major sweep against mercenary
forces, further weakened Federation claims that Ndola was not a
mercenary base.5
After Ndola, Kipushi airfield, which straddled the Katangan-North-
ern Rhodesian border, was the next stop on the route in and out of
Katanga. As one mercenary recalled, he and his comrades ‘flew
regularly’ between the two towns.6 UN reports give credence to the
Ndola-Kipushi link:
Further information received from Elisabethville gives additional evidence that
Ndola Airport is being used as a recruiting and forwarding point for mercen-
aries returning to Katanga … Evidence received from a number of independ-
ent and reliable sources leaves little room for doubt that both recruitment of
mercenaries and provisioning of supplies to the Katangese forces are being
organised along the Rhodesian border. These sources have also confirmed the
1 For an account from the French mercenaries of their war in the Congo, see Colonel Trinquier,
Jacques Duchemin, and Jacques Le Bailly, Notre Guerre au Katanga (Paris, ).
2 Mockler, Mercenaries, p. .
3 UK mission at UN to FO,  Sept. , FO /.
4 Robinson to Home,  Jan. , FO / /. The UN report Robinson quoted from (albeit
with some very minor grammatical changes) can be found at: Statement to the Advisory Committee
on the Congo, New York,  Jan. , by U Thant, in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the
United Nations: VI: U Thant, -, ed. A. Cordier and M. Harrelson (New York, ), pp. -.
5 Embassy, Leopoldville, to FO,  Oct. , FO /.
6 Jones (Elisabethville) to Ure (Leopoldville) and Alexander (FO),  Nov. , FO /.
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entry into Katanga of considerable numbers of Rhodesian and other mer-
cenaries across the frontier at Kipushi.1
Moreover, Federation authorities deceived Alport over the facilities
at Kipushi. Alport complained that he was never told about improve-
ments to the landing facilities at Kipushi, nor alerted to the fact that
camouflaged aeroplanes were visible on the Katangan side of the land-
ing strip. It was also the case, as Alport recalled, that the Federation
authorities exercised no control over the arrival and departure of
flights:
I said [to Welensky] that I was gravely concerned at what appeared to be a
serious breach of faith and that the evidence I possessed seemed to show that
there was collusion between the Federal Army and the Katanga Authorities …
I said that while I was not inferring that either he or Parry [H. N. Parry,
secretary of the Federal cabinet] had deliberately misled us, it was clear that
the orders he had given in my presence [to block Kipushi airfield] were not
being carried out and that the consequences could be very serious for the
reputation of the Federal Government.2
The Federation also became a conduit for supplies and matériel
going to and from Katanga. US intelligence reports noted the passage
through the Federation of military equipment, mercenaries, and
advisers bound for Katanga, and that the Federation provided Katanga
with a vital trans-shipment route for its imports and exports.3
Tshombe’s agents bought Land Rovers, small vehicles, lorries, and
small arms in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Angola;4 the
easiest way to get this equipment to Katanga was via Northern
Rhodesia and the movement of military convoys was a frequent topic
for discussion. U Thant, Hammarskjöld’s successor as UN Secretary-
General, commented on reports that forty vehicles armed with
machine-guns and driven by mercenaries had crossed the Federation
border into Katanga.5 This probably stemmed from an earlier state-
ment by the Congolese foreign minister who protested ‘energetically
against the fact that the authorities of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had
allowed the transportation of equipment and arms to Katanga … He
[the foreign minister] raises the point that, once again, the authorities
have allowed forty-eight jeeps driven by European mercenaries to cross
the border with Katanga.’6 Alport went to see Welensky to discuss the
issue of the convoys crossing Federation territory to and from Katanga:
1 Extract from UN report in UK mission at UN to FO,  Oct. , FO /.
2 Alport to CRO[?],  Dec. , Alport Papers, box , file .
3 US Special National Intelligence Estimate,  Dec. , in FRUS, xx. . See also, James, Britain
and the Congo Crisis, pp. -.
4 FO to UK mission at UN,  Oct. , FO /.
5 U Thant to Dean, passed to Welensky,  Jan. , Welensky Papers, /.
6 Congolese for. min. to British embassy, Leopoldville,  Dec. , FO /.
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When I saw Welensky yesterday to report on my visit to Ndola and to thank
him for the facilities provided for me by the Federal Government, I took the
opportunity of emphasising to him the grave consequences which might arise if
there was any suspicion that any military material, weapons, or personnel were
reaching Katanga from the Federation during the next few days while the
negotiations at Kitona were in progress. I told him that I was not rpt not satis-
fied with the public explanations which had been given respecting the convoy
of - lorries which crossed into Katanga by night some days ago. I said that
while I knew that some of the lorries were meat lorries, as alleged by the
Federal Government, others were reported to me as being painted in Katanga
Army colours carrying goods of an undefined character, and had been taken
over by Katanga Army drivers on the Katanga side of the frontier.1
Commenting on the differences between the Federal and Territorial
administrations in the Federation, Alport’s view was that Welensky –
despite efforts by the Northern Rhodesian governor, Sir Evelyn Hone –
had no intention of closing the border and ‘anyhow the presence of an
active enforcement system might cramp a lot of people’s style.’2 As
Alport noted, at Kipushi ‘local relations with Katangese and Union
Minière personnel are perhaps a shade too cordial.’3 The United
Nations also charged the Federation with assembling seven Fouga
Magister jets smuggled in from Europe and bound for Katanga at the
airbase at Ndola; according to the United Nations, Katangan forces
also quickly made good any losses in equipment after engagements
with UN forces from military stocks in the Federation.4 Considering
these reports, U Thant, in January , addressed the UN Advisory
Committee on the Congo on the issue of the porous nature of the
Federation frontier with Katanga:
I have asked you to come to this meeting for three main reasons: (a) I wish to
consult you about the replies I have received to my request to the governments
of the United Kingdom and Portugal that observers be stationed along the
frontiers of Rhodesia and Angola for the purpose of controlling illicit traffic
with Katanga, about which you have already seen something in the press …
Here I might say that this approach was made because we finally had some
concrete evidence of illicit assistance to Katanga from the Rhodesian side,
which we immediately presented to the British government and which Sir Roy
Welensky has promptly denied in phraseology that could not be described as
gracious.5
Alongside the covert military support afforded Katanga, Welensky
launched a diplomatic offensive in support of Tshombe’s Katanga,
mainly in the form of increasingly strident correspondence with
1 Alport to Home,  Dec. [], Alport Papers, box , file .
2 Ibid.
3 Alport to CRO,  Dec. , Alport Papers, box , file .
4 UN Katanga Command Report,  Dec. , Welensky Papers, /.
5 Statement to the Advisory Committee on the Congo, New York,  Jan. , by U Thant, Public
Papers of the Secretaries-General, ed. Cordier and Harrelson, pp. -.
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Britain. In a series of letters to the foreign secretary, Lord Home, and
Macmillan, Welensky emphasized the dangers facing Tshombe,
pointing out that if he fell from power, ‘the alternatives are too frightful
to contemplate. Surely the time has come for the West … to exert its
influence to retrieve the situation.’1 Unwilling to ‘stand idly by and
watch Mr Tshombe destroyed … if he is in danger of being destroyed
by Afro-Asian pressures masquerading as United Nations operations I
shall do everything in my power to assist his survival’, Welensky
questioned whether the British government had fallen for the Afro-
Asian line that Tshombe was a Belgian puppet.2 While many UN per-
sonnel were convinced that Britain’s opposition to the use of force to
defeat Tshombe was thinly disguised support for Tshombe, Britain
never openly supported Katangan independence or a political union of
the province with the Federation:3 such a move ran counter to the
thrust of British colonial policy and could have led to greater expense
and commitment in Africa. It would also have gone against the wishes
of the United Nations and the United States, both of which wanted to
preserve a united pro-Western Congo.
There was, nevertheless, an element of ambivalence to British policy
toward the Congo: while Britain vacillated over Katanga as it tried to
safeguard its investments in the mining concerns there, it did not
become directly involved.4 Thus, on  July , less than two weeks
after Katanga’s secession, Macmillan passed on a message to Welensky
informing him that if Tshombe were able to sustain his independence,
‘ad hoc recognition would probably have to be considered.’ But as
Macmillan added, it was important that neither Britain nor the Feder-
ation should give any grounds for an accusation that they were assist-
ing in the break-up of the Congo.5 Britain’s willingness to join with
Southern Rhodesia, Belgium, and Portugal in protesting UN actions,
along with Britain’s blocking of overfly rights for UN warplanes that
needed to cross British East Africa to get to Katanga, seemed to give
substance to the charge that Britain was helping Katanga.6 It is true
that elements in the British establishment worked to support the
Federation, something that is noted in the secondary literature, but the
prevailing mood in Britain was that Welensky and the Federation
should work to preserve a united Congo.7 In July , the minister of
1 Welensky to Macmillan,  Jan. , Welensky Papers, /. See also, Welensky to DO by way of
CRO for attention of prime min. and for. sec.,  Sept.  [London, Public Record Office],
D[ominions] O[ffice Records] /.
2 Welensky to Home,  April , Welensky Papers, /.
3 B. Urquhart, Hammarskjöld [] (New York, ), p. .
4 Clarke, Congo Mercenary, p. .
5 Metcalf (Salisbury) to Welensky,  July , Welensky Papers, /.
6 See Home to Welensky,  April , Welensky Papers, / and Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, pp.
, .
7 For British support for Katangan secession, see Murphy, ‘Intelligence and Decolonisation’, pp. -
; Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, pp. , ; and G. Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operation in the
Congo, - (Oxford, ) p. . For a contrary view, see White, ‘Business and Politics of
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state for foreign affairs, John Profumo, when confronted with Captain
Charles Waterhouse, a director of the Union Minière and keen to
interest Britain in Tshombe’s break-away state, made it clear why
Britain opposed secession, pointing to the advantages of a wider settle-
ment that kept the Congo together, as a ‘state truncated of its richest
province would become just the sort of African slum in which com-
munism would be most likely to take root’.1 A few months later, in
September , Macmillan echoed Profumo’s worry, pointing out
that Katangan secession would turn a large tract of Africa into ‘a kind
of Africa slum … wide open to Communist penetration’.2
The generally hostile atmosphere in Britain towards Katangan seces-
sion did not deter Welensky, using his semi-autonomous position in
Salisbury, from trying, unsuccessfully, to convince Britain that it
should provide more help for Katanga. On  August , after the
launch of the first UN operation – Rumpunch – designed to extend its
influence in Katanga against Tshombe’s gendarmes and mercenaries,
Welensky stood up in the Salisbury parliament and accused the organ-
ization of trying to subjugate the province by force, assuring MPs that
he would take ‘necessary measures’ to help the Katangan people who,
‘regardless of race, stood up like heroes’.3 The following day, the
British vice-consul in Elisabethville, who also represented the interests
of the Federation, read the text of Welensky’s speech to Tshombe in a
clear show of support for Katanga.4 Welensky, however, failed in his
attempts to get Britain to honour its pledges to stop the United
Nations from using force in Katanga.5 While unable to check the
United Nations’ move to military action, the Federation, nevertheless,
did all it could to help Katanga, short of direct military intervention,
including the production of propaganda material such as a booklet
published for public consumption that detailed UN atrocities against
white settlers in Katanga. Designed to paint as negative a picture as
possible of the UN force in Katanga, the booklet included statements
of the rape of male and female settlers in Katanga by marauding UN
soldiers.6
While African and Asian states strongly supported Operation Rum-
punch, Welensky’s response was to mobilize troops, armoured cars,
and warplanes, supposedly because of the serious threat to Rhodesian
security. As he stated in parliament in Salisbury: ‘“nothing so disgrace-
ful in the whole history of international organisation” had ever hap-
        
Decolonisation’, p. .
1 Memo, Boothby, ‘Congo: British Business Interests in the Katanga’,  July  , FO /.
2 Macmillan to Barrow,  Sept. , Welensky Papers, /.
3 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, pp. -; R. Welensky, Welensky’s  Days: The Life and Death of the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (London, ) p. .
4 Abi-Saab, United Nations Operation, p. .
5 Welensky to Robinson for Sandys,  Aug. , Welensky Papers, /.
6 United Nations Operations in Katanga, . Evidence Published June , published by the Federal
Government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Welensky Papers, /.
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pened before,’1 and the mobilization of Rhodesia’s armed forces along
the Katangan border was a show of military support for Tshombe.2 To
back up his threat to use force, on  September  Welensky moved
Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF) warplanes to Ndola; with the
RRAF went troops, including Rhodesian Light Infantry units, and
Selous Scouts armoured formations.3 Welensky also issued a warning
that if the United Nations tried to use Sabre jets in Katanga, the
RRAF would be forced to retaliate if, as Welensky believed was inevit-
able, the Sabre jets violated Federation airspace.4 The military build-
up was apparent to visitors to the Federation: Bengt Rosio, the Swed-
ish consul-general in Leopoldville, on a visit to Northern Rhodesia,
found a ‘raw hatred’ of the United Nations and roads ‘absolutely
jammed’ with heavy army vehicles.5 The support given to the Kat-
angans by the Federation might even have extended to the use of bases
inside Northern Rhodesia: in , the US state department reported
that Tshombe’s forces were using Kipushi airfield for logistical sup-
port, movement of soldiers, and as a safe-haven for their warplanes,
something that Welensky vehemently denied.6
The mobilization of Federation military units failed to cow the
United Nations from taking action in Katanga in late  and .
Welensky’s armed forces were too weak militarily to provide Tshombe
with direct military support, and with Britain unwilling to provide
more than fitful diplomatic support, Welensky watched from the side-
lines as UN troops deployed for battle with Tshombe’s mercenary-led
army. Furious at the deployment of UN forces in Katanga in Septem-
ber , Welensky informed the parliament in Salisbury: ‘What has
happened in Elisabethville today is the law of the jungle. The right of
the biggest to impose his will on the smallest … A government that is
out of step can be made to toe the line. If not it can, upon a pretext, be
taken over by the Secretariat of the United Nations.’7 Welensky did
what he could to help Belgian settlers escaping the war in Katanga,8
and he agreed to a secret FISB-organized military operation, opposed
by Britain, in which Rhodesian forces infiltrated into Katanga to help
1 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. . Quotes from A. Gavshon, The Last Days of Dag Hammarskjöld
(London, ).
2 Statement, Welensky to Federal parliament,  Sept. , PREM /.
3 Governor (Salisbury) to CRO,  Sept. , PREM /.
4 ‘Points to emphasise for Daily Express’, Sept. , Welensky Papers, /.
5 Translated and transcribed tape recordings encl. in Smith to de Kemoularia,  Dec. , Smith
Papers, MSS Eng. c.. f.  (p. ).
6 Telegram state dept. to embassy (Brussels),  Dec.  in FRUS, xx. . For denial, see
Welensky to Robinson for Macmillan,  Dec. , Welensky Papers, /.
7 Statement, Welensky to Federal parliament,  Sept. , PREM /. See also, Welensky to
CRO,  July , PREM //; Alport to Duncan Sandys,  Jan. , Alport Papers, box
, file ; Welensky to O’Doneven,  Jan.  [London, British Library] Welensky Papers, Add.
MSS ; and Cabinet Minutes of Federal Cabinet. FGC() th mtg., Federal Cabinet,  April
, Welensky Papers, /.
8 On help for refugees, see Howard (Salisbury) to Whitehead,  Aug.  [Oxford, Rhodes House
Library], Whitehead Papers, MSS Afr. s./c.
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Tshombe leave the province. They also, it seems, took Tshombe’s gold
reserve back to Salisbury for him.1
But direct military intervention was impossible. Thus, from  to
, with the ascendancy of the United Nations in Katanga, the
Federation, with assistance from the Portuguese authorities in Angola
and from South Africa, intensified its policy of destabilizing the Congo
by supporting mercenary forces.
* * * * *
Following defeat at the hands of the United Nations in late  and
, the mercenary force in Katanga gradually dissolved. Some of the
mercenaries, such as Bob Denard, after escaping to Angola, went off to
fight other wars (in Denard’s case, in the Yemen). Many, however, de-
camped to eastern Angola where they ‘signed on’ with the Portuguese;
others, such as Jean (or Jacques) Schramme, simply remained in
Angola alongside over a thousand Katangan gendarmes, all awaiting
orders from Tshombe.2 The Portuguese authorities willingly provided
a safe-haven for the mercenaries and gendarmes from Katanga:3
Portugal had supplied arms – including warplanes – for the mercen-
aries using Luso (now Luena) as a forward base, so it came as no sur-
prise that mercenaries and gendarmes could settle unmolested in
eastern Angola after their defeat in Katanga.4 Indeed, Portuguese
trawlers shipped mercenaries from South Africa to the Congo via
Angola in .5 The mercenaries also took as much heavy military
equipment with them as they could to Angola.6
Using eastern Angola and Northern Rhodesia as their base, mercen-
aries who had been ejected from the Congo by the United Nations
regrouped and re-equipped with Rhodesian and Portuguese help. As
the British embassy in the Congo noted following information
delivered by a secret source:
I am afraid there is growing evidence that we must take seriously the possibility
that Tshombe, with help from outside sources (particularly Rhodesian and
Portuguese) is organising a force of ex-mercenaries and Katangan gendarmes
in Eastern Angola … The entry of fairly large bodies of ex-gendarmes into
Northern Rhodesia … also seems to show that there is some guiding hand at
work … Maybe I am building more into this than is warranted but I cannot
help feeling that it would be only prudent for us to consider whether there is
not evidence to show that certain elements in Southern Rhodesia together with
the Portuguese and Tshombe are acting in concert to constitute an armed
1 ‘The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Observations of a part time spy of the Federal Army.
An account of the service of WF Faulds – Captain – the Royal Rhodesian Regiment, -’
(Pittenweem, ) [Oxford, Rhodes House Library], Faulds Papers, MSS Afr. s..
2 Clark, Congo Mercenaries, p. .
3 Mockler, Mercenaries, pp. -.
4 Wardrop (Luanda) to Foster (FO),  Feb. , FO /.
5 Embassy, Pretoria, to FO,  Sept. . FO /.
6 Leighton (Lusaka) to perm. sec., prime minister’s office,  May , FO /.
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force in Eastern Angola for eventual use in Katanga … The Congolese know
that the ex-mercenaries and ex-gendarmes are using Northern Rhodesia as a
bolt-hole. On November  Ileo gave Bill Wilson a list of ex-mercenaries
(Michel Bloch, Robert Lefebvre, Barthier, Schramme, Bob Denard, Vlaeyen)
who were thought to be using Northern Rhodesia as a base for their activities
… I can only say that if we – or rather the Government of Northern Rhodesia –
not only fail to expel these ex-mercenaries … we shall be seen to the Congolese
and African nationalists in general to be aiding and abetting Tshombe and the
colonialists.1
In -, Tshombe built up, maintained, and paid for a mercenary
force for future use in the Congo, a force which had ‘tentacles in
Northern and Southern Rhodesia and in Angola’.2 Before , the
FISB had forged links with both Portuguese Africa and South Africa,3
including extra-territorial joint Federation-Portuguese operations in
places such as Dar-es-Salaam.4 The Angola operation utilized these
connections, allowing the Federation and the Portuguese to co-
ordinate activities across Northern Rhodesia and Angola. As the
British consul-general in Angola, J. C. Wardrop, saw on a visit to Cav-
ungo in eastern Angola, the Northern Rhodesian police had cordial
relations with their counterparts in Angola and a tradition of cross-
border co-operation. Portuguese officials and British and US mission-
aries stressed ‘the close and easy relations previously maintained
between the Cazombo territory and Northern Rhodesia, referring
among other things to visits made to the Angolan side by Northern
Rhodesian police officials’.5
South Africa’s role in Katanga is less well documented. Before ,
it had been one of the sources for weapons supplied to the mercenaries
fighting in Katanga.6 Bob de Quehen of the FISB encouraged Welen-
sky to push the South African prime minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, to
create an organization such as the FISB that would be able to impress
on Verwoerd the importance of South African involvement in Kat-
anga.7 It is not clear whether he was successful. Certainly, the South
African police did little or nothing to stop the recruitment and passage
of mercenaries for Katanga and the Congo;8 senior South African army
personnel such as Brigadier Jan Robertse and Commandant W. P.
Louw had talks with Tshombe’s contact in South Africa.9 In addition,
South Africa provided the mercenaries with equipment such as boots
and had expressed a willingness to supply other material, an offer
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rescinded after a ‘returning South African mercenary had made in-
discreet remarks about the extent to which the South African Govern-
ment were helping No.  Commando’.1
In July , by which time UN troops had left the Congo,
Tshombe was back in power as the prime minister of a government of
national reconciliation in the Congo, a post he held until October
, when he was replaced by the pro-Western Joseph-Désiré
Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko). Once in power in Leopoldville,
Tshombe recalled his gendarmes from exile to suppress a rebellion by
pro-Lumumba forces in eastern Congo around the city of Stanleyville.
To support the black troops attacking Stanleyville, he built up a strong
force of at least  white mercenaries using the existing cadre in
Angola, plus new mercenaries recruited in Southern Rhodesia and
South Africa.2 In August , Tshombe’s force, led by English-
speaking commanders such as Mike Hoare3 at the head of No.  Com-
mando, attacked eastern Congo assisted by Belgian paratroopers
dropped from US-supplied aeroplanes.4 As with the Katanga operation
of , the mercenaries had been openly recruited in Southern
Rhodesia and South Africa before flying to Kamina in the Congo for
training.5 As British embassy staff in Pretoria noted, South African re-
cruiting offices, under direction from Tshombe in Leopoldville,
enlisted hundreds of recruits in late  and early : ‘Captain Eric
Bridges, in charge of Johannesburg Recruiting Office, has told Press
that he has orders from Leopoldville to launch a new drive for 
South African mercenaries and have them ready for transportation to
Congo within a month. He added that almost all new recruiting would
be in South Africa although there might also be a little in Salisbury.’6
The mercenaries from South Africa – using Jan Smuts Airport in
Johannesburg – flew with a Rhodesian commercial airline via Salisbury
to the Congo; at the same time, Rhodesian banks channelled the mer-
cenaries’ pay.7 The British embassy in Leopoldville reported that the
vast majority of the mercenaries used by Tshombe in - had
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Southern Rhodesian or South African passports, ignoring the fact that
Tshombe also used French-speaking mercenaries in the fighting in
- in eastern Congo.1 Britain could do little to stop the ‘con-
tinuing supply programme’ that Southern Rhodesia ran for the mer-
cenaries in -, knowing that this would be viewed by Welensky as
evidence of a ‘pusillanimous’ approach to the Congo and so ignored.2
Indeed, as late as , Welensky could be found helping a friend who
wanted to serve as a mercenary with the Rhodesians in their counter-
insurgency war against black insurgents.3
In , a resident of Northern Rhodesia had written to Welensky
assuring him that neither he nor his white neighbours had any doubt
that ‘the White Kaffirs of the British Government have betrayed us.
Let us now for the love of God have the “Boston Tea Party.”’4 This
was a sentiment echoed by Welensky who, in , the year that the
Federation collapsed, wrote to a friend explaining that if the British
government ‘think I’m throwing up the sponge they have another thing
coming. I’m determined to do everything I can to see Southern Rho-
desia get its independence. That to me is now priority number one.’5
Welensky and the white settlers of the Federation had their ‘Boston
Tea Party’ when, in , Southern Rhodesia – now led by Ian Smith
whose Rhodesian Front Party had ousted Welensky from power in
 – issued its unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). This
began a long struggle to preserve white rule in Rhodesia, a conflict that
continued until the formation of Zimbabwe in , an event wit-
nessed by Welensky who retired from politics in  and lived until
. As this article has attempted to show, the military and polit-
ical struggle against black rule in the region began in the late s
and early s when the whites of the Federation supported the Bel-
gians and Tshombe in Katanga and the Congo; after , this fight
against black rule moved from the Congo to the borders of Southern
Rhodesia.
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